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Abstract
The embedding of fault tolerance provisions into the
application layer of a programming language is a non-
trivial task that has not found a satisfactory solution
yet. Such a solution is very important, and the lack of
a simple, coherent and effective structuring technique
for fault tolerance has been termed by researchers in
this field as the “software bottleneck of system develop-
ment”. The aim of this paper is to report on the current
status of a novel fault tolerance linguistic structure for
distributed applications characterized by soft real-time
requirements. A compliant prototype architecture is
also described. The key aspect of this structure is that it
allows to decompose the target fault-tolerant application
into three distinct components, respectively responsible
for (1) the functional service, (2) the management of
the fault tolerance provisions, and (3) the adaptation to
the current environmental conditions. The paper also
briefly mentions a few case studies and preliminary re-
sults obtained exercising the prototype.
1. Introduction
1.1. Trusting computer services
Human society more and more expects and relies
on the good quality of complex services supplied by
computers: Computer services are becoming more and
more vital, in the sense that a lack of timely deliv-
ery ever more often can have a severe impact on cap-
itals, the environment, and even human lives. This
state of facts is the consequence of the tremendous
growth in both the complexity and the crucial char-
acter of roles nowadays assigned to computers. The
extent of this process could be hardly foreseen in the
ere-days of modern computing: Those days the main
role of computers was basically that of fast solvers of
numerical problems, which made it to some extent ac-
ceptable that outages and wrong results could occur
rather often1. Computer failures were a bothering fact
to accept and live peacefully with. The very same in-
crease in computer reliability and performance pushed
up the introduction of computer services till they actu-
ally permeated our society. Consequently, what we call
the criticality of computer services—that is, the mag-
nitude of the consequences of a computer failure—has
dramatically increased and, with it, the need for guar-
antees that computer failures can be avoided or their
extent bounded. Dependability, or the trustworthiness
of a computer system such that reliance can justifiably
be placed on the service it delivers [22], became a fun-
damental requirement.
Devising methods to fulfil the requirement for de-
pendability of computer services has been and still is
a hot research topic. We are not going to review those
methods, but merely observe that they can be classified
according to the (physical or virtual) machine they ad-
dress: as an example, hardware fault tolerance (HFT)
is the name of the class of methods that target phys-
ical faults and aim at preventing that they bring the
physical machine to a failure. We believe HFT is an
important requirement to achieve a truly dependable
computer service, as it addresses the basement of the
1This excerpt from a report on the ENIAC activity [31] gives
an idea of how dependable computers were in 1947: “power line
fluctuations and power failures made continuous operation di-
rectly off transformer mains an impossibility [. . . ] down times
were long; error-free running periods were short [. . . ]”. After
many considerable improvements, still “trouble-free operating
time remained at about 100 hours a week during the last 6 years
of the ENIAC’s use”, i.e., a reliability of about 60%!
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hierarchy of machines that collectively supply that ser-
vice. Likewise we are convinced that, as any computer
service is the result of the concurrent progress of a hi-
erarchy of machines, service dependability may be best
reached through a strategy that target the whole of the
hierarchy: Failing to consider a tassel means weaking
a link in the chain—a single point of overall service
failure.
The top of the hierarchy—the application layer—is
no exception. On the contrary, a design fault at this
level may well be as jeopardizing as a physical fault in
the hardware machine, for the application layer is the
very “place” where the service is specified (in its more
abstract terms).
It is this general purpose character that makes so
difficult devising an application level fault tolerance
(ALFT) strategy: Indeed, while effective solutions have
been found, e.g., for the hardware, the operating sys-
tem, and the middleware layers, the problem of an ef-
fective system structure for expressing fault tolerance
provisions in the application layer of computer pro-
grams is still an open one.
Structuring techniques provide means to control
complexity, the latter being a relevant factor for pre-
venting the introduction of design faults. This fact and
the ever increasing complexity of today’s distributed
software justify the need for simple, coherent, and ef-
fective structures for the expression of fault tolerance
in the application software. This paper describes the
“recovery language approach” (RεL), i.e., a structuring
technique for the expression of the fault tolerance de-
sign aspects in the applications characterized by soft
real-time requirements. The RεL technique in particu-
lar addresses three requirements of fault-tolerant soft-
ware design:
R1 Separation of the functional and fault tolerance
design aspects, such that the two design concerns
do not conflict with each other.
R2 Dynamic adaptability to varying environmental
conditions, obtained through a sort of dynamic
linking of the fault tolerance executable code.
R3 A syntactical structure capable of hosting a wide
class of fault tolerance (FT) provisions2.
The above requirements are met by exploiting RεL’s
capability to partition the design complexity of a dis-
tributed application into three components:
1. An application-specific component realizing the
functional specification.
2By “FT provision” we mean any strategy (e.g. recovery
blocks), or mechanism (such as watchdog timers), that can be
used to introduce FT aspects into an application.
2. A special-purpose component dealing with the
management of the FT provisions.
3. A special-purpose component responsible for the
run-time adaptation of the FT provisions to the
current environmental conditions.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Sec-
tion 2 introduces the elements of our approach. Sec-
tion 3 describes a RεL-compliant prototype software
architecture that has been developed in the frame-
work of the two ESPRIT projects EFTOS (“embed-
ded fault-tolerant supercomputing”) [15] and TIRAN
(“tailorable fault tolerance frameworks for embedded
applications”) [2]. That architecture focuses on com-
ponent 2. Section 3 also mentions a few case stud-
ies where RεL is proving its effectiveness. The pa-
per is concluded by Sect. 4, which also provides the
reader with the elements of a new RεL-compliant ar-
chitecture. Such architecture, which is being devel-
oped in the framework of the IST-2000-25434 project
DepAuDE (“Dependability for embedded Automation
systems in Dynamic Environments with intra-site and
inter-site distribution aspects”), is to fully exploit the
capabilities of RεL. The key goal of this architecture is
to realize all the special-purpose components of a fully
RεL-compliant distributed architecture, leaving to the
user the sole management of the service specification.
2. The Recovery Language Approach
This section describes RεL, a FT linguistic struc-
turing technique for distributed applications with soft
real-time constraints. By structuring technique we
mean a set of methods by means of which it is pos-
sible to express and to manage some FT provision.
In the following, we will characterize both the above
“methods”—expressing and managing a FT provision.
Furthermore, in order to characterize our technique
with respect to the existing ones, we will make use,
informally, of a “base” of structural properties, namely
sc: separation of design concerns,
a: adaptability to a varying environment, and
sa: syntactical adequacy, i.e., the adequacy of the
technique at hosting a FT provision, averaged on
the set of possible FT provisions.
Clearly the above properties respectively match re-
quirement R1, R2 and R3. In what follows we will
show that RεL is a simple, coherent, and effective FT
linguistic structure that provides satisfactory values of
the three structural properties (sc, a, sa) in the do-
main of soft real-time, distributed applications.
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In RεL two distinct programming languages are
available to the programmer: a service language, i.e.,
the programming language addressing the functional
design concerns, and a special-purpose linguistic struc-
ture (called “recovery language”) for the expression of
error recovery and reconfiguration tasks. This recov-
ery language comes into play either asynchronously, as
soon as an error is detected by an underlying error
detection layer, or when some erroneous condition is
signaled by the application processes. Error recovery
and reconfiguration are specified as a set of guarded
actions, i.e., actions that require a pre-condition to be
fulfilled in order to be executed. Recovery actions deal
with coarse-grained entities of the application and the
system, and pre-conditions query the current state of
those entities. An example of a recovery action is the
following one:
if a transient faults affects “task 10” :
restart task 10
notify the group of tasks to which task 10 belongs
end
A larger example of guards and actions can be seen in
Sect. 3, where a prototype RεL-compliant architecture
is described.
An important added value ofRεL is that it allows for
the expression of the recovery actions to be done in
a design and programming context other than the one
in which the expression of the functional service takes
place. This minimizes non-functional code intrusion
and hence enhances property sc.
The execution of the recovery actions is done via a
fixed (i.e., special-purpose) scheme, portrayed in the
sequence diagram of Fig. 1: as soon as an error is de-
tected, a notification describing that event is sent to
a distributed entity responsible for the collection and
the management of these notifications. Let us call such
entity the “backbone” (BB). Immediately after storing
each notification, the guards of the recovery actions are
evaluated. Guards evaluation is done by querying the
BB. When a guard is found to be true, its correspond-
ing actions are executed, otherwise they are skipped.
The just sketched strategy represents the way RεL
performs its management of the FT provisions to be
embedded in the target application. An important con-
sequence of the adoption of this strategy is that the
functional executable code and the non-functional ex-
ecutable code are distinct : the former implements the
user tasks, while the latter is given by a proper cod-
ing of the recovery actions. This allows to decompose
the design process into two distinct phases. When the
interface between the two “aspects” is simple and well-
defined, this provides a way to control the design com-
Figure 1. Scheme of execution of a RεL-compliant ap-
plication: together with the application, two special-
purpose tasks are running—a system-wide database
management system (we call it the “backbone”), which
stores error detection notifications sent by a periphery
of detection tools, and a “recovery application”, i.e., a
task responsible for the execution of the recovery ac-
tions. The diagram describes the execution of the user-
specified recovery actions. The dotted line represents
a jump to the execution of the next guarded action, if
any. Error recovery ends when the last guarded action is
evaluated.
plexity, which decreases development times and costs.
In the current implementation, described in Sect. 3, the
recovery actions are translated into a “recovery pseudo-
code” (we call it r-code) that is interpreted by an r-
code virtual machine. Currently, the r-code can either
be read from a file or “hardwired” in the r-code vir-
tual machine. The separability of the r-code from the
functional code provides the elements for the approach
described in Sect. 4, which focuses on adaptability and
FT software reuse.
The above strategy clearly focuses on the error re-
covery step of FT. In order to minimize the code in-
trusion due to error detection and fault masking, we
envisaged a configuration language that allows the
user to set up ready-to-use instances of provisions se-
lected from a custom library of single-version FT mech-
anisms, including, e.g., a watchdog timer or a voting
tool. These instances are also instrumented in such a
way as to forward transparently their notifications to
the BB. Notifications include, e.g., a watchdog timer’s
alarm, or a caught division-by-zero exception, or a mi-
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nority input value to a voting tool. An example of con-
figuration language can be seen in Sect. 3. The same
translator that turns the recovery actions into the r-
code is used in that case to write the source files with
the configured instances.
2.1. System and Application Models
The target system for RεL is assumed to be a dis-
tributed or parallel system. Basic components are
nodes, tasks, and the network. A node can be, e.g.,
a workstation in a networked cluster or a processor
in a MIMD parallel computer. Tasks are independent
threads of execution running on the nodes. The net-
work system allows tasks on different nodes to com-
municate with each other. Nodes can be commercial-
off-the-shelf hardware components with no special pro-
visions for hardware FT. A general-purpose operating
system (OS) is required on each node. No special pur-
pose, distributed, or fault-tolerant OS is required. The
system obeys the timed asynchronous distributed sys-
tem model [5]:
• Tasks communicate through the network via a
datagram service with omission/performance fail-
ure semantics [4].
• Services are timed: specifications prescribe not
only the outputs and state transitions that should
occur in response to inputs, but also the time in-
tervals within which a client task can expect these
outputs and transitions to occur.
• Tasks (including those related to the OS and the
network) have crash/performance failure seman-
tics [4].
• Tasks have access to a node-local hardware clock.
If more than one node is present, clocks on differ-
ent nodes have a bounded drift rate.
• A “time-out” service is available at application-
level: using it, tasks can schedule the execution of
events so that they occur at a given future point
in time, as measured by their local clock.
In particular, this model allows a straightforward mod-
eling of system partitioning—as a consequence of suf-
ficiently many omission or performance communica-
tion failures, correct nodes may be temporarily dis-
connected from the rest of the system during so-called
periods of instability [5]. A message passing library is
assumed to be available, built on the datagram service.
Such library offers asynchronous, non-blocking multi-
cast primitives. As clearly explained in [5], the above
hypotheses match well to nowadays distributed systems
based on networked workstations—as such, they rep-
resent a general model with no practical restriction.
The following assumptions characterize the user appli-
cation:
• The service is supplied by a distributed applica-
tion.
• It is written or is to be written in a procedural or
object-oriented language such as C or Java.
• The application is non safety-critical.
• The target application is characterized by soft
real-time requirements. In particular, perfor-
mance failures may occasionally show up during
error recovery.
• Inter-process communication takes place by means
of the functions in the above mentioned message
passing library. Higher-level communication ser-
vices, if available, must be based on the message
passing library as well.
As suggested, e.g., in [28], any effective design including
dependability goals requires provisions, located at all
levels, to avoid, remove, or tolerate faults. Hence, as an
application-level structuring technique, RεL is comple-
mentary to other approaches addressing FT at system
level, i.e., hardware-level and OS-level FT. In particu-
lar, a system-level architecture such as GUARDS [25],
that is based on redundancy and hardware and OS pro-
visions for systematic management of consensus, ap-
pears to be particularly appropriate for being coupled
with RεL which offers application-level provisions for
N-version programming and replication (see Sect. 3).
2.2. Work-flow of RεL
This section describes the work-flow corresponding
to the adoption of the RεL approach. Figure 2 sum-
marizes the work-flow. The following basic steps have
been foreseen:
• In the first steps (labels 1 and 2 in the cited figure),
the designer describes the key application and sys-
tem entities, such as tasks, groups of tasks, and
nodes. The main tool for this phase is the config-
uration language.
• Next (step 3), the designer configures a number of
basic FT tools (BTs) he or she has decided to use.
The configuration language is used for this. The
output of steps 1–3 is the configuration code.
4
Figure 2. A work-flow diagram for RεL. Labels refer to
usage steps and are described in Sect. 2.2.
• Next (step 4), the designer defines which condi-
tions need to be caught, and which actions should
follow each caught condition. The resulting list is
coded as a number of guarded actions via a recov-
ery language.
• The configuration code and the recovery code are
then converted via the translator into a set of C
header files, C fragments, and system-specific con-
figuration files (steps 5 and 6). These files repre-
sent: configured instances of the BTs, of the sys-
tem and of the application; initialization files for
the communication management functions; user
preferences for the BB; and the recovery pseudo-
code.
• On steps 7–9, the application source code and a
set of configured instances of BTs are compiled
in order to produce the executable codes of the
application.
• Next, the BB and the recovery interpreter are com-
piled on steps 10–13.
The resulting components, i.e., the executable codes
of the application, the backbone, and RINT, represent
the entities portrayed in Fig. 2.
In the following we briefly summarize the specific
differences between ours and other novel approaches.
2.3. Specific Differences with respect to Other Ap-
proaches
Numerous techniques have been devised in the past
to solve the problem of optimal and flexible devel-
opment of dependability services to be embedded in
the application layer of a computer program. In [6],
some of these approaches are critically reviewed and
qualitatively assessed with respect to a set of struc-
tural attributes (separation of design concerns, syntac-
tical adequacy and adaptability). A non-exhaustive
list of the systems and projects implementing these
approaches is also given in the cited reference. In par-
ticular, approaches based on metaobject protocols [20]
(MOPs), FT distributed programming languages [27]
and aspect-oriented programming [21] (AOP) are re-
viewed therein.
Metaobject Protocols. The key idea behind MOPs
is that of “opening” the implementation of the run-time
executive of an object-oriented language like C++ or
Java so that the developer can adopt and program dif-
ferent, custom semantics, adjusting the language to the
needs of the user and to the requirements of the envi-
ronment. Using MOPs, the programmer can modify
the behavior of fundamental features like methods in-
vocation, object creation and destruction, and mem-
ber access. The key concept behind MOPs is that of
computational reflection, or the causal connection be-
tween a system and a meta-level description represent-
ing structural and computational aspects of that sys-
tem [24]. An architecture supporting this approach is
FRIENDS [17]. FRIENDS implemented a number of
FT provisions (e.g., replication, group-based commu-
nication, synchronization, voting) as MOPs.
A number of studies confirm that MOPs reach effi-
ciency in some cases [20], though no experimental or
analytical evidence allows to estimate the practicality
and the applicability of this approach [26, 23]. MOPs
only support object-oriented programming languages
and require special extensions or custom programming
languages.
Aspect-oriented Programming Languages.
Aspect-oriented programming [21] is a programming
methodology and a structuring technique that explic-
itly addresses, at system-wide level, the problem of the
best code structure to express different, possibly con-
flicting design goals like for instance high performance,
optimal memory usage, or dependability.
Developed as a Xerox PARC project, AspectJ is
an aspect-oriented extension to the Java programming
language [19, 23]. A study has been carried out on
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the capability of AspectJ as an AOP language sup-
porting exception detection and handling [23]. It has
been shown how AspectJ can be used to develop so-
called “plug-and-play” exception handlers: libraries of
exception handlers that can be plugged into many dif-
ferent applications. This translates into better support
for managing different configurations at compile-time.
Up to now, no AOP tool or programming language ex-
ists for flexible development of dependable services: As-
pectJ only addresses exception detection and handling.
Remarkably enough, the authors of a recent study on
AspectJ and its support to this field conclude [23] that
“whether the properties of AspectJ [documented in this
paper] lead to programs with fewer implementation er-
rors and that can be changed easier, is still an open
research topic that will require serious usability stud-
ies as AOP matures”.
3. The ariel Configuration and Recovery
Language
This section describes a prototypic architecture
based on RεL that has been developed during recently
ended project TIRAN. In the following, in Sect. 3.1 we
present the contents of TIRAN. The main components
of the TIRAN architecture are then briefly introduced
in Sect. 3.2. In particular, the TIRAN recovery lan-
guage, ariel, is reported in Sect. 3.3 and a few case
studies in Sect. 3.4.
3.1. The TIRAN Project
The main objective of project TIRAN (ESPRIT
28620) has been to develop a software framework that
provides fault-tolerant capabilities to automation sys-
tems. Application-level support to FT is provided by
means of a RεL-compliant architecture, which is de-
scribed in the rest of this section. The framework pro-
vides a library of software FT provisions that are para-
metric and support an easy configuration process. Us-
ing the framework, application developers are allowed
to select, configure and integrate provisions for fault
masking, error detection, isolation and recovery among
those offered by the library. Goal of the project is to
provide a tool that significantly reduces the develop-
ment times and costs of a new dependable system. The
target market segment concerns non-safety-critical dis-
tributed soft-real-time embedded systems [3]. TIRAN
explicitly adopts formal techniques to support require-
ment specification and predictive evaluation [16]. This,
together with the intensive testing on pilot applica-
tions, is exploited in order to:
Figure 3. A representation of the TIRAN elements. The
central, whiter layers constitute the TIRAN framework.
This same structure is replicated on each processing
node of the system.
• Assess the correctness of the framework.
• Quantify the fulfillment of time, dependability and
cost requirements.
• Provide guidelines to the configuration process of
the users.
Most of this framework has been designed for being
platform independent. A single version of the frame-
work has been written in the C programming language
making use of a library of “basic services” (BSL) devel-
oped by the TIRAN consortium. The TIRAN frame-
work is currently running on Windows-NT, Windows-
CE, the Virtuoso microkernel [29], VxWorks, and the
TEX microkernel [30].
The project results, driven by industrial users’ re-
quirements and market demand, is being integrated
into the Virtuoso microkernel and adopted by ENEL
and SIEMENS within their application fields.
3.2. The TIRAN Framework
Figure 3 draws the TIRAN architecture and posi-
tions its main components into it. In particular, the
box labeled “Ariel” represents the TIRAN recovery
language, ariel. The central, whiter layers represent
the TIRAN framework. In particular:
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• Level 0 hosts the BSL (see Sect. 3), which gives
system-independent access to the services pro-
vided by the underlying run-time system.
• Level 1 services are provided by a set of BTs for
error detection and fault masking (level 1.1) and
by another set addressing isolation, recovery and
reconfiguration (level 1.2). These services are not
distributed on multiple nodes.
• Level 2 hosts the TIRAN BB [10]. This is the
component responsible for the management of the
distributed database (DB) that maintains records
describing errors detected by Level 1.1 BTs. It also
includes a time-out management system, called
TOM [11], and a recovery interpreter, RINT, ac-
tually a virtual machine executing the r-code. The
BB executes an algorithm, described in [10], which
allows it to tolerate node and component crashes
and to withstand partitioning caused by tempo-
rary periods of communication instability. The BB
straightforwardly supports the α-count fault iden-
tification mechanism [1] by feeding α-count filters
immediately after the arrival of each new error de-
tection notification. In Fig. 3, the edge connecting
RINT to ariel means that RINT actually imple-
ments (executes) the ariel programs. Note the
control and data messages that flow from BB to
TOM, DB, and RINT. RINT also sends control
messages to the isolation and recovery BTs. These
are low-level messages that request specific recov-
ery actions. Data messages flow also from BB to
a monitoring tool [13].
• Dependable mechanisms (DMs), i.e., high-level,
distributed FT tools exploiting the services of the
BB and of the BTs, are located at level 3. These
tools include a distributed voting tool [9], a dis-
tributed synchronization tool, and a data stabi-
lizer [12]. The DMs receive notifications from
RINT in order to execute reconfigurations such as,
for instance, introducing a spare task to take over
the role of a failed task.
The layers around the TIRAN framework in Fig. 3 rep-
resent (from the layer at the bottom and proceeding
counter-clockwise):
• The run-time system.
• The functional application layer and the recov-
ery language application layer (again, box labeled
“Ariel”).
• Amonitoring tool, for hypermedia rendering of the
current state of the system within the windows of
a WWW browser.
Next section focuses on the key component of the
TIRAN prototype, namely, the ariel recovery lan-
guage.
3.3. The ariel Language
Within TIRAN, a single syntactical framework—
provided by the ariel language—serves the applica-
tion designer as both a configuration and a recovery
language. ariel is a language with a syntax somewhat
similar to that of the UNIX shells. ariel deals with
five basic types: “nodes”, “tasks”, “groups”, integers,
and real numbers. A node is a uniquely identifiable
processing node of the system, e.g., a processor of a
MIMD supercomputer. A task is a uniquely identifi-
able process or thread in the system. A group is a
uniquely identifiable collection of tasks, possibly run-
ning on different nodes. Nodes, tasks, and groups are
generically called entities. Entities are uniquely identi-
fied via non-negative integers; for instance, NODE3 or N3
refer to processing node currently configured as num-
ber 3. Symbolic constants can be “imported” from C
language header files through the statement INCLUDE.
When curly brackets appear around a string, the value
of the corresponding symbolic constant is returned.
The key statement in ariel is the IF, which is used
to code a recovery action as follows:
IF [ guard ] THEN actions,
where a guard checks whether an entity, according to
the current contents of the database, is in one of the
following states: active; affected by a fault; affected by
a transient fault; isolated; restarted. A guard can also
check the current “phase” of a task, e.g., its current
algorithmic step, that the task can declare via a custom
BSL function. Actions can be guards—which allows to
represent recovery actions as trees—and remote or local
commands for: sending messages to tasks and groups;
terminating, isolating, starting or restarting an entity.
Restarting a node means rebooting it, terminating a
node means performing a node shutdown. Isolating a
task means disabling its communication descriptors. A
local command is executed by the local BB component,
while a remote one is first sent to the corresponding BB
component and then executed by it.
ariel allows also to configure its BTs. For instance,
the following syntax:
INCLUDE "mydefinitions.h"
WATCHDOG {MYWD} WATCHES TASK {MYTASK}
HEARTBEATS EVERY {HEARTBEAT} MS
ON ERROR WARN TASK {CONTROLLER}
END WATCHDOG
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produces a source code configuring a watchdog that,
once enabled by its first heartbeat, expects new such
messages every HEARTBEAT milliseconds, or sends task
CONTROLLER an alarm message. Note that in this case
the error detection code intrusion is reduced to the
function call for sending heartbeats. Configuration also
includes replicated tasks and N-version programming.
Syntaxes for retry blocks and consensus recovery blocks
have been also implemented.
The ariel translator, called “art”, produces both
the configured instances of the BTs and the recovery
pseudo-code (r-code). The latter can either be out-
put as a binary file, to be read by RINT at run-time,
or as an include file to be compiled with RINT. This
r-code is then re-executed by RINT each time the back-
bone notifies it that a new event has been stored in the
database—as described in Fig. 1.
3.4. Case Studies
The ariel language and the TIRAN framework
have been exercised in the course of project EFTOS
and project TIRAN on a number of case studies, in as
different an application domain as postal automation,
electrical substation automation, and airport light-
ing systems. These case studies were formulated by
two members of the EFTOS and TIRAN consortia
(Siemens and ENEL) and have their origin within the
internal strategies of those companies. One of these
case studies is reported in [14]. Another noteworthy
case study has been the development of a Level 3 FT
mechanism supporting distributed voting. This tool
exploits two features of ariel: first, it makes use of
spare components—error recovery strategies like recon-
figuration and graceful degradation (when spares are
exhausted) can be expressed in terms of ariel scripts
and result in no code intrusion. Secondly, it exploits
the built-in support of the α-count fault identification
mechanism in order to let the user express different er-
ror recovery strategies depending on the nature of the
corresponding faults. This allows to express recovery
actions such as:
IF [ FAULTY TASK {MYTASK} ]
THEN
IF [ TRANSIENT TASK {MYTASK} ]
THEN Conservative strategy
(e.g., restart the task)
ELSE Reconfiguration
FI
FI.
This aims at keeping reconfiguration as the ultimate
solution in order to minimize the rate at which redun-
dancy is “consumed”. Markov modeling of this ap-
proach shows that it allows to enhance considerably
reliability [6]. For the sake of brevity we refer to the
cited sources for a full description of the case studies
and their evaluation.
4. Conclusions and Future Work
A novel fault tolerance linguistic structure for dis-
tributed applications has been briefly described. Such
structure is at the core of the strategy that is cur-
rently being designed within IST-2000-25434 Project
“DepAuDE” to allow dependable real-time applica-
tions with intra-site and inter-site distribution aspects
to adapt to a changing environment ([8] briefly men-
tions the key ideas behind the DepAuDE strategy).
The design of the elements of the architecture sketched
in this paper, which explicitly addresses requirement
R1, R2 and R3, is one of the goals of DepAuDE. As
mentioned before, RεL is being used in several case
studies with promising results. One of these case stud-
ies is described in [14]. The adoption of a recovery lan-
guage within a generative communication infrastruc-
ture (such as the one of LINDA [18]) is also currently
being experimented [7].
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